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On the relative advantage of cooperatives

  • Svend Albæk

    (Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen)

  • Christian Schultz

    (Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen)

We show that the fact that farmers in a cooperative individually decide how much to supply to cooperative may serve as a commitment device for credibility (and profitably) gaining market share in competition with a profit maximizing firm.

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File URL: http://www.econ.ku.dk/cie/dp/dp_1997-1999/1998-02.pdf/
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Paper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics in its series CIE Discussion Papers with number 1998-02.

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Length: 8 pages
Date of creation: Apr 1998
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in: Economics Letters. June 1998; 59(3): 397-401
Handle: RePEc:kud:kuieci:1998-02
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  1. Chaim Fershtman & Kenneth L Judd, 1984. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," Discussion Papers 642, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Farrell, J. & Shapiro, C., 1988. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," Papers 17, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
  3. Vickers, John, 1985. "Delegation and the Theory of the Firm," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 138-47, Supplemen.
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