On Coalitional Stability and Single-peakedness
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References listed on IDEAS
- Benassy, Jean-Pascal, 1996. "Taste for variety and optimum production patterns in monopolistic competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 41-47, July.
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- Fujinaka, Yuji & Wakayama, Takuma, 2015. "Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 165-185.
- Yamamura, Hirofumi, 2016. "Coalitional stability in the location problem with single-dipped preferences: An application of the minimax theorem," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 48-57.
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KeywordsSingle-peakedness; Augmented median voter rule; Strong Nash equilibrium; Coalition-proof Nash Equilibrium; Minimax theorem; Manipulation;
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-05-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2011-05-24 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2011-05-24 (Game Theory)
- NEP-POL-2011-05-24 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-PUB-2011-05-24 (Public Finance)
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