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A hybrid game with conditional and unconditional veto power

Author

Listed:
  • Werner Güth

    () (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group)

  • M. Vittoria Levati

    () (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, and DSE, University of Verona)

  • Natalia Montinari

    (Economics Department, Lund University)

  • Chiara Nardi

    (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, and DSE, University of Verona)

Abstract

In the hybrid game, one proposer confronts two responders with veto power: one responder can condition his decisions on his own offer but the other cannot. We vary what the informed responder knows about the offers as well as the uninformed responder's conflict payoff. Neither variation affects behavior: proposers always favor informed responders, who frequently accept minimal offers.

Suggested Citation

  • Werner Güth & M. Vittoria Levati & Natalia Montinari & Chiara Nardi, 2014. "A hybrid game with conditional and unconditional veto power," Jena Economic Research Papers 2014-015, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
  • Handle: RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2014-015
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    Keywords

    Ultimatum; Yes/No game;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior

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