A hybrid game with conditional and unconditional veto power
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Güth, Werner & Levati, Vittoria & Montinari, Natalia & Nardi, Chiara, 2014. "A Hybrid Game with Conditional and Unconditional Veto Power," Working Papers 2014:16, Lund University, Department of Economics.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- repec:spr:italej:v:4:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s40797-017-0070-2 is not listed on IDEAS
More about this item
KeywordsUltimatum; Yes/No game;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-CDM-2014-06-14 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EXP-2014-06-14 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2014-06-14 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2014-06-14 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2014-015. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Markus Pasche). General contact details of provider: http://www.jenecon.de .
We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .