Subsidizing Start-Ups: Policy Targeting and Policy Effectiveness
Start-up subsidies are a frequently employed policy instrument, the use of which is justified by alleged market failure resulting from positive external effects and capital market imperfections. This article investigates whether the allocation of subsidies reflects a policy focus on addressing these market failure occurrences. However, using survey data from the East German state of Thuringia, logistic regressions reveal a rather random subsidization of start-ups. Furthermore, propensity score matching suggests that subsidized start-ups would have survived and thrived in any case, an indication of deadweight losses of start-up subsidies. The analysis points to serious information problems arising when subsidies should be allocated to remedy market failure. Making the situation even more problematic is that failure to precisely target start-up subsidies is likely to result in market distortions and ineffectiveness.
|Date of creation:||13 Oct 2009|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Carl-Zeiss-Strasse 3, 07743 JENA|
Phone: +049 3641/ 9 43000
Fax: +049 3641/ 9 43000
Web page: http://www.jenecon.de
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2009-083. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Markus Pasche)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.