Downsizing the Labor Force by Low and High Proïfit Firms - An Experimental Analysis1
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More about this item
Keywordsdownsizing; experimental economics; principal-agent model; labor economics;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- J01 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General - - - Labor Economics: General
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-11-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2008-11-25 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2008-11-25 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-LAB-2008-11-25 (Labour Economics)
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