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Cheap Talk and Secret Intentions in a Public Goods Experiments

Author

Listed:
  • Werner Güth

    () (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group)

  • M. Vittoria Levati

    () (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group)

  • Torsten Weiland

    () (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group)

Abstract

In a public goods experiment, subjects can vary over a period of stochastic length two contribution levels: one is publicly observable (their cheap talk stated intention), while the other is not seen by the others (their secret intention). When the period suddenly stops, participants are restricted to choose as actual contribution either current alternative. Based on the two types of choice data for a partners and a perfect strangers condition, we confirm that final outcomes strongly depend on the matching protocol. As to choice dynamics, we distinguish different types of adaptations.

Suggested Citation

  • Werner Güth & M. Vittoria Levati & Torsten Weiland, 2007. "Cheap Talk and Secret Intentions in a Public Goods Experiments," Jena Economic Research Papers 2007-048, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
  • Handle: RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2007-048
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    Cited by:

    1. Lotito, Gianna & Migheli, Matteo & Ortona, Guido, 2011. "An experimental inquiry into the nature of relational goods," POLIS Working Papers 160, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
    2. repec:spr:grdene:v:24:y:2015:i:4:d:10.1007_s10726-014-9409-3 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public goods game; Cheap talk communication; Real-time protocol;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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