The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1954-55 and U.S.-R.O.C Relations
On September 3, 1954, Chinese artillery began shelling Quemoy (Jinmen), one of the Kuomintang-held offshore islands, setting off the first Taiwan Strait Crisis. This paper focuses on the crisis and analyzes the following three questions: (1) What was the policy the U.S. took towards the Republic of China (R.O.C), especially towards the offshore islands, to try to end the Taiwan Strait Crisis? (2) What were the intentions of the U.S. government in trying to end the Taiwan Strait Crisis? And (3) how should U.S. policy towards the R.O.C. which led to solving the Taiwan Strait Crisis be positioned in the history of Sino-American relations? Through analysis of these questions, this study concludes that the position the U.S. took to bring an end to crisis, one which prevented China from â€œliberating Taiwanâ€ and the Kuomintang from â€œattacking the mainland,â€ brought about the existence of a de facto â€œtwo-Chinaâ€ situation.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2010|
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|Publication status:||Published in IDE Discussion Paper. No. 223. 2010. 02|
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