Constitutional Review and Democratic Consolidation: A Literature Review
This paper reviews the literature on the prevalence of constitutional review acrossthe world, and particularly in emerging democracies, during the last two decades.Two major questions should be addressed in this regard. First, why has thejudiciary been empowered and what factors affect judicial activism? Second, doesconstitutional review ensure an effective self-enforcing function? In sum, theliterature shows that constitutional review can make democracy self-enforcing ifthere is sufficient competition among political parties or between the legislatureand the executive branch of government. In a more sophisticated case, politicalbalance within the court can also ensure the observance of court decisions.
|Date of creation:||01 Jan 2009|
|Publication status:||Published in IDE Discussion Paper = IDE Discussion Paper, No. 192. 2009-01-01|
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