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The Empirical Content of Marital Surplus in Matching Models

Author

Listed:
  • Doorley, Karina

    (Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin)

  • Dupuy, Arnaud

    (University of Luxembourg)

  • Weber, Simon

    (KU Leuven)

Abstract

This note investigates the extent to which structural estimates of marital surplus are informative about subjective well-being and separation. We first estimate the marital surplus using a simple matching model of the marriage market with perfectly transferable utility and heterogeneity in tastes applied to a rich German panel dataset. We then show that these estimates of the marital surplus are negatively correlated with separation and the difference in spouses' subjective satisfaction.

Suggested Citation

  • Doorley, Karina & Dupuy, Arnaud & Weber, Simon, 2018. "The Empirical Content of Marital Surplus in Matching Models," IZA Discussion Papers 11823, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp11823
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Arnaud Dupuy & Alfred Galichon, 2014. "Personality Traits and the Marriage Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 122(6), pages 1271-1319.
    2. Gretsky, Neil E & Ostroy, Joseph M & Zame, William R, 1992. "The Nonatomic Assignment Model," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 2(1), pages 103-127, January.
    3. Pierre-André Chiappori & Bernard Salanié & Yoram Weiss, 2017. "Partner Choice, Investment in Children, and the Marital College Premium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(8), pages 2109-2167, August.
    4. Alfred Galichon & Scott Kominers & Simon Weber, 2015. "The Nonlinear Bernstein-Schrödinger Equation in Economics," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03393000, HAL.
    5. Arnaud Dupuy, 2021. "Migration in China: To work or to wed?," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 36(4), pages 393-415, June.
    6. Gretsky, Neil E. & Ostroy, Joseph M. & Zame, William R., 1999. "Perfect Competition in the Continuous Assignment Model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 60-118, September.
    7. Pierre-André Chiappori & Sonia Oreffice & Climent Quintana-Domeque, 2012. "Fatter Attraction: Anthropometric and Socioeconomic Matching on the Marriage Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 120(4), pages 659-695.
    8. Arnaud Dupuy & Alfred Galichon, 2014. "Personality traits and the marriage market," Post-Print hal-03470458, HAL.
    9. Eugene Choo & Aloysius Siow, 2006. "Who Marries Whom and Why," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(1), pages 175-201, February.
    10. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/361levbcs399s9oa154em6h9jl is not listed on IDEAS
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    matching market; marital surplus; subjective well-being; separation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D1 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior

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