IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Corporate governance and impression management in annual press releases

Listed author(s):
  • Beatriz García Osma

    (Lancaster University)

  • Encarna Guillamón Saorín

    (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)

We study the association between corporate governance and impression management in annual results press releases (ARPRs). Press releases constitute a timely vehicle to communicate firm performance to third parties. However, oftentimes, managers provide self-serving disclosures that attempt to distort readers¿ perceptions of corporate achievements. Corporate governance mechanisms actively monitor managerial disclosures, improving firm transparency. Thus, we predict that strong governance (i) increases firm voluntary release of ARPRs, and (ii) reduces impression management in those ARPRs. Tests are based on a sample of Spanish firms. The results confirm that strong governance firms are more likely to release an ARPR. In particular, board independence and the existence of remuneration and audit committees significantly determine this type of voluntary disclosure. We also show that strong governance limits impression management practices, consistent with governance monitoring effectively reducing self-serving disclosures by management. Our evidence is consistent with impression management being associated to firm news, suggesting that these practices respond, at least partly, to informative motivations. En este trabajo investigamos la asociación entre el gobierno corporativo y la manipulación de la presentación de la información en las notas de prensa. Las notas de prensa son uno de los medios que usan las empresas para comunicarse con terceras partes. A veces, las empresas revelan información con la intención de mostrar una imagen sesgada de la empresa. El gobierno corporativo es uno de los mecanismos que controlan la manipulación en la revelación de información y mejora la transparencia. Nuestras expectativas son que empresas con mejor gobierno corporativo (i) incrementen la revelación voluntaria y (2) muestren menos manipulación de la presentación de información en sus notas de prensa. Hemos analizado empresas Españolas cotizando en la Bolsa de Madrid. En particular, hemos encontrado que la independencia de los directivos y la existencia de comités de remuneración y de auditoria determinan el tipo de revelación de información voluntaria. Estos resultados confirman el papel de control que ejerce el gobierno corporativo para reducir efectivamente la presentación engañosa de la información. Nuestros resultados también muestran que la manipulación esta relacionada con las noticias de las empresas, lo que sugiere que estas practicas responden, al menos en parte, a razones informativas.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
File Function: Fisrt version / Primera version, 2009
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) in its series Working Papers. Serie EC with number 2009-02.

in new window

Length: 54 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2009
Publication status: Published by Ivie
Handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasec:2009-02
Contact details of provider: Postal:
C/ Guardia Civil, 22, Esc 2a, 1o, E-46020 VALENCIA

Phone: +34 96 319 00 50
Fax: +34 96 319 00 55
Web page:

More information through EDIRC

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasec:2009-02. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Departamento de Edición)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.