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Divulgación Voluntaria Estratégica Ante Un Nuevo Evento Laboral: Evidencia Empírica Para El Mercado Continuo Español

Listed author(s):
  • Ana María Sabater


    (Universidad de Alicante)

  • Joaquina Laffarga

    (Universidad de Sevilla)

Registered author(s):

    The aim of this paper is to analyse the disclosure activity in press around a labor event, for the companies quoted on Spanish continuous market and the reaction of stock prices of those firms affected by such events. The previous period to the signature of a firm level collective agreement offers potentially strong incentives for the firm its disclosure policy in the previous year to the signature. If the disclosure policy can increase the returns of the firm via a, reduction of asymmetric information or to hyping the stock price, this may result in a lower cost of capital. However the company can have incentives to change the opinion of the union about the solvency and futures cash flows of the firm, in such a form that the increase agreed in the wages is the minor possible. Therefore, the disclosure policy confronts a conflict of objectives. On the one hand, the desire to influence on the market with an aggressive policy of disclosure of good news, reducing the negative effect that the signature has on the market. On the other hand, the desire of the agreement being the most favourable for the firm. Our results provide evidence both directions. El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar la actividad de divulgación en prensa escrita alrededor de un evento laboral y los movimientos del precio de los títulos afectados por el evento, de las empresas cotizadas en el mercado continuo español. El periodo anterior a la firma de un convenio de empresa ofrece incentivos potencialmente fuertes para cambiar la política de divulgación de una compañía. Si la política de divulgación puede aumentar la rentabilidad de la firma, bien por reducción de la asimetría informativa o por promocionar la acción, ésta disfrutará de un coste de capital menor. Pero también la empresa puede tener incentivos para cambiar la opinión del sindicato acerca de la solvencia y futuros flujos de caja de la empresa, de tal forma que, el incremento pactado en los salarios sea lo menor posible. Por ello, la política divulgadora de la empresa afronta un conflicto entre el deseo de influenciar al mercado con una política agresiva de divulgación de buenas noticias, paliando el efecto negativo que la firma del convenio tiene sobre el mercado y, por otro lado, el deseo de que la negociación del convenio sea lo más favorable para la empresa. Nuestros resultados proporcionan evidencia de ambos casos.

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    File Function: Fisrt version / Primera version, 2006
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    Paper provided by Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) in its series Working Papers. Serie EC with number 2006-01.

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    Length: 50 pages
    Date of creation: Feb 2006
    Publication status: Published by Ivie
    Handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasec:2006-01
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