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El Gobierno Corporativo Y Las Practicas De Earnings Management: Evidencia Empirica En España


  • Belén Gill de Albornoz

    () (Universitat Jaume I)

  • Beatriz García Osma

    (Lancaster University)


We test whether corporate governance mechanisms promoted by best practice codes are effective in constraining earnings manipulation in Spain, as previously documented in the US and the UK. We show that to a certain extent an Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance may turn out to be a failure when used in a different institutional setting. In this sense, we show that independent experts are inefficient in reducing accounting manipulation in our sample, except when they are designated by institutional directors. Our results are consistent with alternative specifications of discretionary accruals models to estimate the earnings manipulation magnitude. El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar la relación entre las prácticas de gobierno corporativo de las empresas españolas y su propensión a llevar a cabo prácticas manipuladoras del resultado. Para ello, se utiliza la información de 155 respuestas al cuestionario que la CNMV remitió a las empresas cotizadas para que voluntariamente ofreciesen información sobre sus prácticas de gobierno, siguiendo las recomendaciones del Código Olivencia. De forma consistente con la evidencia presentada en el contexto anglosajón, los resultados sugieren que los consejeros dominicales, representantes de los inversores institucionales, constituyen un freno a las prácticas manipuladoras. Sin embargo, observamos que la presencia de consejeros independientes está positiva y significativamente relacionada con el nivel de manipulación, excepto cuando estos consejeros son elegidos por miembros dominicales. Los resultados son consistentes al utilizar el valor absoluto de los ajustes por devengo discrecionales producidos por varios modelos alternativos como medida del nivel de manipulación.

Suggested Citation

  • Belén Gill de Albornoz & Beatriz García Osma, 2005. "El Gobierno Corporativo Y Las Practicas De Earnings Management: Evidencia Empirica En España," Working Papers. Serie EC 2005-11, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  • Handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasec:2005-11

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    More about this item


    Gobierno corporativo; earnings management; ajustes por devengo discrecionales Corporate governance; earnings management; discretionary accruals;

    JEL classification:

    • G39 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Other
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

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