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A Model For Team Managers In The Presence Of Self-Serving Workers

Author

Listed:
  • Brice Corgnet

    () (Universidad de Navarra)

Abstract

We develop a model of team formation in which workers learn about their level of ability. We show that insufficient cooperation may arise as workers learn positively about their own skills. We then build a model for team managers and establish that their objectivity in assessing coworkers' abilities may facilitate cooperation among agents. This is the case because managers are able to design team contracts based on workers' true performances. Our work provides a motive for the existence of team managers in theabsence of asymmetry of information. We develop a model of team formation in which workers learn about their level of ability. We show that insufficient cooperation may arise as workers learn positively about their own skills. We then build a model for team managers and establish that their objectivity in assessing coworkers¿ abilities may facilitate cooperation among agents. This is the case because managers are able to design team contracts based on workers¿ true performances. Our work provides a motive for the existence of team managers in theabsence of asymmetry of information.

Suggested Citation

  • Brice Corgnet, 2007. "A Model For Team Managers In The Presence Of Self-Serving Workers," Working Papers. Serie AD 2007-18, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  • Handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2007-18
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    File URL: http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-2007-18.pdf
    File Function: Fisrt version / Primera version, 2007
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General

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