A Classroom Experiment About Tradable Permits
This article describes an experimental market designed for undergraduate classes in agricultural economics, environmental economics, public finance, or rural development. The experiment is a series of double-oral auctions that demonstrate private and social costs, externalities and market failures, and the efficiency of tradable permits relative to Pigouvian taxes. The novel feature is the non-pecuniary way that the negative production externality is mimicked in the classroom experiment. Details, instructions, and suggestions for how to tailor the experiment for different classes or purposes are included.
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|Date of creation:||01 Jan 2000|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Review of Agricultural Economics 2000, vol. 22 no. 2, pp. 586-606|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: +1 515.294.6741
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Web page: http://www.econ.iastate.edu
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