Information Asymmetries, Uncertainties, and Cleanup Delays at Superfund Sites
Superfund cleanup has been extremely slow. Traditional analysis has centered around reducing negotiation and litigation to expedite the cleanup process. We investigate other factors which provide possible incentives for delay, namely, discounting, risk aversion, and compensation for off-site damage. We find that liability share plays an essential role in PRPs' incentives to delay. Commonly adopted EPA strategies, such as negotiating with PRP steering committees and buying outde minimisPRPs, may also lead to delay. The paper also designs a Bayesian mechanism for information extraction, and finds that the lump-sum transfer mechanism is not always efficient.
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|Date of creation:||01 Jan 1998|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, January 1998, vol. 35 no. 1, pp. 48-68|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070|
Phone: +1 515.294.6741
Fax: +1 515.294.0221
Web page: http://www.econ.iastate.edu
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