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Auctions with Resale Market and Asymmetric Information

Author

Listed:
  • Rodrigo Harrison

    () (Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.)

  • Roberto Muñoz;
  • Felipe Varas

Abstract

In this paper we study the role of resale opportunities in secondary markets over the bidding process in first and second price auctions. This trade opportunity arises owing to the presence of two factors. On the one hand, after receiving the object, the winner obtains new information about the object's value and on the other hand, the winner may suffer a liquidity shock that force him to sell the object regardless of his valuation. The buyer in the secondary market, however, does not know if the good is being sold because the new information reveals bad news regarding the object's valuation, or because a liquidity shock affected the seller. Our results show that revenue equivalence still holds, and bids are usually lower than those observed in the absence of liquidity shocks.

Suggested Citation

  • Rodrigo Harrison & Roberto Muñoz; & Felipe Varas, 2008. "Auctions with Resale Market and Asymmetric Information," Documentos de Trabajo 332, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
  • Handle: RePEc:ioe:doctra:332
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    File URL: http://www.economia.uc.cl/docs/dt_332.pdf
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    Keywords

    Auctions; resale market; adverse selection;

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance

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