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Trump ended WTO dispute settlement. Trade remedies are needed to fix it

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  • Chad P. Bown

    (Peterson Institute for International Economics)

Abstract

Unhappy with the rulings of the WTO dispute settlement system, which disproportionately targeted US use of trade remedies, the United States ended the entire system in 2019. There are multiple hurdles to agreeing to new terms of trade remedy use and thus potentially restoring some form of binding dispute settlement. First, a change would affect access to policy flexibility by the now large number of users of trade remedies. Second, although China's exports are the overwhelming target of trade remedies, exporters in other countries increasingly find themselves caught up in trade remedy actions linked to China. Third, critical differences posed by China's economic model may call for new rules for trade remedies, but no consensus on those rules has emerged. Even some of the most promising reforms have practical limitations, create additional challenges, or may be politically unviable.

Suggested Citation

  • Chad P. Bown, 2022. "Trump ended WTO dispute settlement. Trade remedies are needed to fix it," Working Paper Series WP22-1, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:iie:wpaper:wp22-1
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    Cited by:

    1. Ostry, Jonathan D. & Furceri, Davide & Papageorgiou, Chris & Wibaux, Pauline, 2023. "Retaliation through Temporary Trade Barriers," CEPR Discussion Papers 17853, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    WTO; dispute settlement; Appellate Body; trade remedies; antidumping; countervailing duties; safeguards; US; China;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

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