Sharp identification regions in models with convex predictions: games, individual choice, and incomplete data
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- Marc Henry & Ismael Mourifié, 2013.
"Euclidean Revealed Preferences: Testing The Spatial Voting Model,"
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John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(4), pages 650-666, June.
- Marc Henry & Ismael Mourifié, 2011. "Euclidean Revealed Preferences: Testing the Spatial Voting Model," CIRANO Working Papers 2011s-49, CIRANO.
- Marc Henry & Ismael Mourifie, 2011. "Euclidean Revealed Preferences: Testing the Spatial Voting Model," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-822, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Paul B. Ellickson & Stephanie Houghton & Christopher Timmins, 2010. "Estimating Network Economies in Retail Chains: A Revealed Preference Approach," NBER Working Papers 15832, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Áureo de Paula, 2013.
"Econometric Analysis of Games with Multiple Equilibria,"
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- Áureo de Paula, 2012. "Econometric analysis of games with multiple equilibria," CeMMAP working papers CWP29/12, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
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