Competition in Access Technologies
This paper presents a simple model of local telecommunications market when two access technologies, landline and wireless, are available. The two technologies differ in their cost structures and in the services they provide to consumers; specifically, the wireless technology allows its subscribers to enjoy mobility. We characterize the equilibrium under nonlinear pricing of such a market within two different settings. In the first one, there is a single operator who can use both technologies. In the second setting, there are two competing operators, each using a single technology.
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