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The Political Market with Asymmetric Information and Hybrid Democracy

Author

Listed:
  • Liudmyla Vozna

Abstract

This article discusses why “the worst get on top” and the failure of democracy when the political market has distorted information flows. The political market here is examined during the electoral process, where voters become similar to employers on the labor market and “buy” the services of political work. The article goes to demonstrate that when politics becomes more commercialized, the asymmetry of information flow increases and the equilibrium of the political market is disturbed, eventually leading to the collapse of democratic institutions. The article also attempts to analyze the market with asymmetric information through the asymmetric positioning of supply and demand curves.

Suggested Citation

  • Liudmyla Vozna, 2013. "The Political Market with Asymmetric Information and Hybrid Democracy," STOREPapers 13_2013, Associazione Italiana per la Storia dell'Economia Politica - StorEP.
    • Handle: RePEc:hpo:wpaper:13_2013
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    File URL: https://www.storep.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/STEP-2013-13-Vozna.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gary M. Anderson & Robert D. Tollison, 1988. "Democracy, Interest Groups, and the Price of Votes," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 8(1), pages 53-70, Spring/Su.
    2. Loukas Balafoutas, 2011. "How much income redistribution? An explanation based on vote-buying and corruption," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 146(1), pages 185-203, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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