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Cultural Goods and Laboratory Experiments

In a two-stage public goods experiment, we study the framing effect due to the adoption of a cultural context. Our results show a slight increase in the allocations of subjects’ endowments to the cultural good when the cultural context is implemented in the laboratory. In particular, in one treatment, the framing effect has a strong impact in the last two periods only.

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File URL: http://www.rhul.ac.uk/economics/Research/WorkingPapers/pdf/dpe0506.pdf
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London in its series Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics with number 05/06.

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Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: May 2005
Date of revision: May 2005
Handle: RePEc:hol:holodi:0506
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  1. David Throsby, 2011. "Cultural Capital," Chapters, in: A Handbook of Cultural Economics, Second Edition, chapter 20 Edward Elgar Publishing.
  2. Elliott, Catherine S. & Hayward, Donald M., 1998. "The expanding definition of framing and its particular impact on economic experimentation," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 229-243.
  3. Potters, J.J.M. & van Winden, F.A.A.M., 2000. "Professionals and students in a lobbying experiment - Professional rules of conduct and subject surrogacy," Other publications TiSEM 964c6542-3994-4088-a7e6-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  4. Jack L. Knetsch & J. A. Sinden, 1984. "Willingness to Pay and Compensation Demanded: Experimental Evidence of an Unexpected Disparity in Measures of Value," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 99(3), pages 507-521.
  5. Kahneman, Daniel & Knetsch, Jack L., 1992. "Valuing public goods: The purchase of moral satisfaction," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 57-70, January.
  6. Bohm, Peter & Lind, Hans, 1992. "A note on the robustness of a classical framing result," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 355-361, June.
  7. Bolton, G. & Katok, E., 1995. "An Experimental Test of the Crowding Out Hypothesis: The Nature of Beneficient Behavior," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 295.95, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  8. Klaus Abbink & Heike Hennig-Schmidt, 2006. "Neutral versus loaded instructions in a bribery experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 9(2), pages 103-121, June.
  9. Elizabeth Hoffman & Kevin McCabe & Vernon Smith, 2000. "The Impact of Exchange Context on the Activation of Equity in Ultimatum Games," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 3(1), pages 5-9, June.
  10. Eckel, Catherine C. & Grossman, Philip J., 1996. "Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 181-191, October.
  11. repec:feb:artefa:0072 is not listed on IDEAS
  12. Throsby, David, 1994. "The Production and Consumption of the Arts: A View of Cultural Economics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 32(1), pages 1-29, March.
  13. Willinger, Marc & Ziegelmeyer, Anthony, 1999. "Framing and cooperation in public good games: an experiment with an interior solution," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 323-328, December.
  14. CHAMPARNAUD, Luc & GINSBURGH, Victor & MICHEL, Philippe, 2002. "Can cultural education crowd out arts subsidization ?," CORE Discussion Papers 2002040, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  15. Massimo Finocchiaro Castro, 2005. "Behaviour in a Two-Stage Two Public Goods Experiment," Experimental 0504002, EconWPA.
  16. Park, Eun-Soo, 2000. "Warm-glow versus cold-prickle: a further experimental study of framing effects on free-riding," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(4), pages 405-421, December.
  17. Druckman, James N, 2001. "Using Credible Advice to Overcome Framing Effects," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 17(1), pages 62-82, April.
  18. Sonnemans, Joep & Schram, Arthur & Offerman, Theo, 1998. "Public good provision and public bad prevention: The effect of framing," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 143-161, January.
  19. Victor Ginsburgh & Pierre-Michel Menger, 1996. "Economics of the Arts: Selected essays," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/152420, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
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