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Asymmetric Tax Competition in a Repeated Game Setting


  • Itaya, Jun-ichi
  • Okamura, Makoto
  • Yamaguchi, Chikara


The purpose of this paper is to reveal how fiscal policy cooperation can result from repeated interactions in an asymmetric model of capital tax competition. We investigate how regional differences in the per capita capital endowments and/or production technologies affects the willingness of each region to cooperate in achieving tax coordination in a multi-period framework. It is shown not only that there may exist cases where tax coordination is facilitated as regional asymmetries increase but also that the larger the asymmetry in terms of the net capital-exporting positions among regions, the easier is the cooperation to sustain tax coordination. (JEL classification: H73, H77)

Suggested Citation

  • Itaya, Jun-ichi & Okamura, Makoto & Yamaguchi, Chikara, 2006. "Asymmetric Tax Competition in a Repeated Game Setting," Discussion paper series. A 176, Graduate School of Economics and Business Administration, Hokkaido University.
  • Handle: RePEc:hok:dpaper:176

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    Cited by:

    1. Itaya, Jun-ichi & Okamura, Makoto & Yamaguchi, Chikara, 2008. "Are regional asymmetries detrimental to tax coordination in a repeated game setting?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(12), pages 2403-2411, December.

    More about this item


    Tax competition; Asymmetric regions; Cooperation; Repeated game; Tax coordination; H73; H77;

    JEL classification:

    • H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism


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