From Segmented Markets to Integrated Markets: An Analysis of Economic Integration and Antidumping Law
This paper examines the effects of a movement from segmented markets to integrated markets on the volume of trade, consumer prices, and profits in a monopoly model. The monopolist discriminates prices among segmented markets but takes account of arbitrage under integrated markets. The analysis provides interesting insights into economic integration and antidumping law. Surprising results are that neither consumers nor monopolist may gain from economic integration; and that an antidumping suit may benefit consumers at the cost of producers. Whether consumers benefit or not depends on the shape of marginal cost, the curvature of demand curves, the presence of trade tax, and the existence of the third countries.
|Length:||26, , 1 p.|
|Date of creation:||Jan 2000|
|Date of revision:|
|Note:||This version: January 6, 2000 (First draft: January 1999)|
|Contact details of provider:|| Phone: +81-42-580-8000|
Web page: http://www.econ.hit-u.ac.jp/
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