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Formation of the Credit Rating Agency Regulation in Russia


  • Anton S. Selivanovsky

    () (National Research University Higher School of Economics)


This Working Paper is dedicated to the new system of legal regulation of credit rating agency (hereinafter “CRA”) activity in Russia. The main focus of the new rules is administrative regulation and rigid control of procedural issues by the Russian mega-regulator for financial markets. The author criticizes current legislation and argues that such rules will obstruct CRA activity and adversely affect protection of investors’ and creditors’ rights, and will ultimately lead to an increase in transaction costs. It is necessary to continue work on CRA regulation in order to develop effective mechanisms to ensure a balance of interests among parties to the credit rating contract, and ensure that investors and the regulator take into account not only legal, but also economic, managerial, organizational and a number of other issues. Regulation of CRA focused only on rigid control of procedural issues by the Bank of Russia will not lead to the desired result. CRA regulation should instead be "delicate and fine."

Suggested Citation

  • Anton S. Selivanovsky, 2016. "Formation of the Credit Rating Agency Regulation in Russia," HSE Working papers WP BRP 65/LAW/2016, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hig:wpaper:65/law/2016

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    More about this item


    credit rating agencies; securities market; conflict of interests; regulation of credit rating agencies; liability of rating agencies;

    JEL classification:

    • Z - Other Special Topics

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