Increased patronage for urban bus transport with net-cost contracts
Simulations of net cost contracts augmented with a subsidy per passenger for public transport bus operators in Sweden indicate that such contracts may shift the operators profit maximising price and frequency combination in a direction that yields an increased patronage. The calculations suggest that a subsidised increase in patronage is welfare improving. The simulations unfortunately also indicate that such contracts may become very costly for the public transport authority. In a system with franchised contracts we however suggest that a large part of these costs may be recovered as a bid for the contract. In this study we can not calculate all the potential adaptations that the operator may undertake to optimise the supply. We therefore conjecture that a net cost contract augmented with a subsidy may well be a reasonable policy to achieve increased patronage.
|Date of creation:||03 Nov 2010|
|Date of revision:|
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