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Decentralized Fiscal Federalism Revisited: Optimal Income Taxation and Public Goods under Horizontal Leadership

Author

Listed:
  • Aronsson, Thomas

    () (Department of Economics, Umeå University)

  • Persson, Lars

    () (Department of Economics, Umeå University)

Abstract

This paper concerns optimal taxation and public goods in an economic federation with decentralized leadership, where one lower level government is first mover also in the horizontal dimension. Under plausible assumptions, horizontal leadership reinforces the incentives created by decentralized leadership.

Suggested Citation

  • Aronsson, Thomas & Persson, Lars, 2012. "Decentralized Fiscal Federalism Revisited: Optimal Income Taxation and Public Goods under Horizontal Leadership," Umeå Economic Studies 839, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:umnees:0839
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    File URL: http://www.econ.umu.se/DownloadAsset.action?contentId=183027&languageId=3&assetKey=ues839
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    Cited by:

    1. Lars Persson, 2015. "Incentives underlying tax policies in a decentralized federation with horizontal leadership and transboundary environmental damage," Letters in Spatial and Resource Sciences, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 77-88, March.
    2. Silva, Emilson Caputo Delfino, 2014. "Selective decentralized leadership," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 1-5.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Optimal taxation; redistribution; public goods; fiscal federalism; decentralized leadership; horizontal leadership;

    JEL classification:

    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation

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