Decentralized Fiscal Federalism Revisited: Optimal Income Taxation and Public Goods under Horizontal Leadership
This paper concerns optimal taxation and public goods in an economic federation with decentralized leadership, where one lower level government is first mover also in the horizontal dimension. Under plausible assumptions, horizontal leadership reinforces the incentives created by decentralized leadership.
|Date of creation:||23 Feb 2012|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Department of Economics, Umeå University, S-901 87 Umeå, Sweden|
Phone: 090 - 786 61 42
Fax: 090 - 77 23 02
Web page: http://www.econ.umu.se/
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:umnees:0839. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (David Skog)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.