Decentralized Fiscal Federalism Revisited: Optimal Income Taxation and Public Goods under Horizontal Leadership
Download full text from publisher
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Lars Persson, 2015. "Incentives underlying tax policies in a decentralized federation with horizontal leadership and transboundary environmental damage," Letters in Spatial and Resource Sciences, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 77-88, March.
- Silva, Emilson Caputo Delfino, 2014. "Selective decentralized leadership," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 1-5.
More about this item
KeywordsOptimal taxation; redistribution; public goods; fiscal federalism; decentralized leadership; horizontal leadership;
- D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-02-27 (All new papers)
- NEP-PBE-2012-02-27 (Public Economics)
- NEP-URE-2012-02-27 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:umnees:0839. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (David Skog). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/inumuse.html .
We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .