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Budget deficits as devices for appropriating extra funds: An investigation of sharing rules

  • Grepperud, Sverre

    ()

    (Institute of Health Management and Health Economics)

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    This paper considers a model with a sponsor and several bureaus to analyse the role of sharing rules. Various incentives for budget overspending are identified; among them the overspending of budgets due to soft budget constraints. Four different sharing rules are also considered that differ with respect to their strategic properties and whether the share is exogenous or endogenous. The results show that sharing on the basis of egalitarian principles yields a lower budget deficit than sharing based upon relative deficits both in symmetric and asymmetric games. The ranking of deficits that follow from sharing based upon relative budgets and sharing that equalises ex-post debt ratios is shown to depend on the properties of the health production function.

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    File URL: http://www.hero.uio.no/publicat/2002/HERO2002_11.pdf
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    Paper provided by Oslo University, Health Economics Research Programme in its series HERO On line Working Paper Series with number 2002:11.

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    Length: 21 pages
    Date of creation: 29 Jun 2009
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:hhs:oslohe:2002_011
    Contact details of provider: Postal: HERO / Institute of Health Management and Health Economics P.O. Box 1089 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
    Phone: 2307 5309
    Fax: 2307 5310
    Web page: http://www.hero.uio.no/eng.html
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