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Condorcet Methods - When, Why and How?

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  • Stensholt, Eivind

    () (Dept. of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration)

Abstract

Geometric representations of 3-candidate profiles are used to investigate properties of preferential election methods. The representation visualizes both the possibility to win by agenda manipulation, i.e. introducing a third and chanceless candidate in a 2-candidate race, and the possibility to win a 3-candidate election through different kinds of strategic voting. Here the focus is on the "burying" strategy in single-winner elections, where the win is obtained by ranking a main competitor artificially low. Condorcet methods are compared with the major alternatives (Borda Count, Approval Voting, Instant Runoff Voting). Various Condorcet methods are studied, and one method is proposed that minimizes the number of noncyclic profiles where burying is possible.

Suggested Citation

  • Stensholt, Eivind, 2008. "Condorcet Methods - When, Why and How?," Discussion Papers 2008/11, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:nhhfms:2008_011
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11250/163942
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Tijs, S.H. & Driessen, T.S.H., 1986. "Game theory and cost allocation problems," Other publications TiSEM 376c24c5-c95d-4d29-96b6-4, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    2. Lemaire, Jean, 1984. "An Application of Game Theory: Cost Allocation," ASTIN Bulletin: The Journal of the International Actuarial Association, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(01), pages 61-81, April.
    3. S. H. Tijs & T. S. H. Driessen, 1986. "Game Theory and Cost Allocation Problems," Management Science, INFORMS, pages 1015-1028.
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    Keywords

    Preferential election methods; agenda manipulation; strategic voting;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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