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The Role of the 'Equally Efficient Competitor' in the Assessment of Abuse of Dominance

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Abstract

In a series of recent cases - most notably in TeliaSonera and Post Danmark - the equally efficient competitor principle has been explicitly recognised by the Court of Justice of the EU; more clearly so than by courts in the US, where the principle originates. However the exact scope of application of the principle in the EU remains to be defined. While its use in cases concerning predatory pricing and margin squeeze appears to be settled, it is still unclear to what extent the standard applies to other price-based forms of exclusion. And is the principle at all useful in the assessment of non-price-based exclusionary conduct? This article discusses the conceptual basis for the equally efficient competitor principle, and attempts to define its role in the assessment of exclusionary abuse in the EU.

Suggested Citation

  • Mandorff, Martin & Sahl, Johan, 2013. "The Role of the 'Equally Efficient Competitor' in the Assessment of Abuse of Dominance," Konkurrensverket Working Paper Series in Law and Economics 2013:1, Konkurrensverket (Swedish Competition Authority).
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:kkveco:2013_001
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    Cited by:

    1. Benli, Erman & Emin-Benli, Hande, 2015. "The political economy of margin squeeze liability in the Turkish telecommunications market: A comparative assessment," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 104-110.

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    Keywords

    equally efficient competitor; abuse of dominance; monopolization; exclusion; competition law; competition economics; antitrust;

    JEL classification:

    • K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General

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