The Role of the 'Equally Efficient Competitor' in the Assessment of Abuse of Dominance
In a series of recent cases - most notably in TeliaSonera and Post Danmark - the equally efficient competitor principle has been explicitly recognised by the Court of Justice of the EU; more clearly so than by courts in the US, where the principle originates. However the exact scope of application of the principle in the EU remains to be defined. While its use in cases concerning predatory pricing and margin squeeze appears to be settled, it is still unclear to what extent the standard applies to other price-based forms of exclusion. And is the principle at all useful in the assessment of non-price-based exclusionary conduct? This article discusses the conceptual basis for the equally efficient competitor principle, and attempts to define its role in the assessment of exclusionary abuse in the EU.
|Date of creation:||15 May 2013|
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