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Monitoring and Pay: General results

Author

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  • Allgulin, Magnus

    (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics)

Abstract

This paper considers the opitmal incentives for motivating a risk neutral, wealth constrained agent. In particular, monitoring and pay are shown to be complementary instruments under very general conditions, extending earlier results by Allgulin and Ellingsen (1998). The paper also proves that linear incentive schemes are strictly sub-optimal in this setting.

Suggested Citation

  • Allgulin, Magnus, 1999. "Monitoring and Pay: General results," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 340, Stockholm School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:hastef:0340
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    Cited by:

    1. Pablo González, 2002. "Profit Sharing Reconsidered: Efficiency Wages and Renegotiation Costs," Documentos de Trabajo 151, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Monitoring; efficiency wages; incentive pay;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts

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