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Shareholder-Value Maximization and Tacit Collusion

Author

Listed:
  • Spagnolo, Giancarlo

    (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics)

Abstract

This paper shows that as long as the stock market has perfect foresight, some dividends are distributed, and incentives are paid more than once or are deferred, stock-related compensation packages are strong incentives for managers to support tacit collusive agreements in repeated oligopolies. The stock market anticipates the losses from punishment phases and discounts them on stock prices, reducing managers' short-run gains from any deviation. When deferred, stock-related incentives may remove all managers' short-run gains from deviation making collusion supportable at any discount factor. The results hold with managerial contracts of any length.

Suggested Citation

  • Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 1998. "Shareholder-Value Maximization and Tacit Collusion," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 235, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 29 Nov 1998.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:hastef:0235
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ritzberger, Klaus & Shorish, Jamsheed, 2002. "Cross-Ownership Among Firms: Some Determinants of the Separation of Ownership from Control," Economics Series 113, Institute for Advanced Studies.
    2. Victor Dorofeenko & Larry Lang & Klaus Ritzberger & Jamsheed Shorish, 2008. "Who controls Allianz?," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 75-103, January.
    3. Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2005. "Managerial incentives and collusive behavior," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 1501-1523, August.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    CEO compensation; tacit collusion; oligopoly; delegation; managerial incentives; ownership and control; corporate governance.;

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm

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