Exclusivity and Bidding for Premium Broadcasting Rights
Often, we observe that some TV channels are distributed on several platforms, and by several distributors on the same platform, while others are distributed exclusively by one distributor. In this paper, we analyse a TV channelel's incentives for choosing exclusive distribution versus full distribution. We then proceed by studying if bidding for premium content (e.g., broadcasting rights to football) influences the incentives for choosing exclusive distribution. We show that absent of premium content, the channel has incentives to choose exclusive distribution, but the existence of premium con- tent dramatically reduces these incentives, and full distribution is the likely outcome.
|Date of creation:||04 Aug 2008|
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