Resisting reform in the public sector: theory and historical evidence from the UK

Reform in the public sector treats organisations as equal under one law. This is despite large inequalities in practical, de facto, powers. I argue that these inequalities can distort meritocratic reforms. I collected and digitised individual-level data on thousands of entrants to the British Civil Service from 1864-1875. Exploiting an 1870 reform that forced meritocratic hiring on a large part of, but not all, the public sector, I find that patronage use declined among treated organisations, but was not extinguished in spite of comprehensive legislation. I find that variation in non-compliance among treated organisations is driven by heterogeneity in de facto powers. Powerful organisations continue to use patronage after reform due to their exploitation of ‘grey areas’ in legislative design. My analysis shows a clear issue with assuming external validity from existing work that focuses on lower status, frontline, public sector organisations; the tail does not wag the dog.