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Crime Networks with Bargaining and Build Frictions

Author

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  • Bryan Engelhardt

    () (Department of Economics, College of the Holy Cross)

Abstract

How does the timing, targets and types of anti-crime policies affect a network when criminal retailers search sequentially for wholesalers and crime opportunities? Given the illicit nature of crime, I analyze a non-competitive market where players bargain over the surplus. In such a market, some anti-crime policies distort revenue sharing, reduce matching frictions and increase market activity or crime. As an application, the model provides a new perspective on why the U.S. cocaine market saw rising consumption after the introduction of the “War on Drugs.”

Suggested Citation

  • Bryan Engelhardt, 2008. "Crime Networks with Bargaining and Build Frictions," Working Papers 0813, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hcx:wpaper:0813
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    File URL: http://web.holycross.edu/RePEc/hcx/HC0813-Engelhardt_CrimeNetworks.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    crime; networks; search; matching;

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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