IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Political versus Economic Institutions in the Growth Process

  • Emmanuel Flachaire

    ()

    (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille III - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - CNRS : UMR6579)

  • Cecilia Garcìa-Peñalosa

    ()

    (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille III - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - CNRS : UMR6579)

  • Maty Konte

    (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille III - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - CNRS : UMR6579)

After a decade of research on the relationship between institutions and growth, scholars in this field seem to be divided. Economic institutions perform well in growth regressions and a body of literature argues that this supports the key importance of institutions for development. Other authors maintain that the type of constraints that the recent theoretical literature describes are the more stable political institutions, and these have been found to play no role in empirical growth analyses. In this paper we re-examine the role that institutions play in the growth process using cross-section and panel data for both developed and developing economies over the period 1970-2000. Our results indicate that the data is best described by an econometric model with two growth regimes. Political institutions are the key determinant of which growth regime an economy belongs to, while economic institutions have a direct impact on growth rates within each regime. These findings support the hierarchy of institutions hypothesis, whereby political institutions set the stage in which economic institutions and policies operate.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/58/60/38/PDF/DTGREQAM2011_20.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number halshs-00586038.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 14 Apr 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00586038
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00586038/en/
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2001. "Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution," NBER Working Papers 8460, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Fabio Canova, 2004. "Testing for Convergence Clubs in Income Per Capita: A Predictive Density Approach," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 45(1), pages 49-77, 02.
  3. Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, 1995. "Institutions And Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(3), pages 207-227, November.
  4. Tommaso Nannicini & Roberto Ricciuti, 2010. "Autocratic Transitions and Growth," CESifo Working Paper Series 2967, CESifo Group Munich.
  5. Daron Acemoglu & Philippe Aghion & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2002. "Distance to Frontier, Selection, and Economic Growth," NBER Working Papers 9066, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Eicher, Theo S. & Papageorgiou, Chris & Roehn, Oliver, 2007. "Unraveling the fortunes of the fortunate: An Iterative Bayesian Model Averaging (IBMA) approach," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 494-514, September.
  7. Di Vaio, Gianfranco & Enflo, Kerstin, 2011. "Did globalization drive convergence? Identifying cross-country growth regimes in the long run," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(6), pages 832-844, August.
  8. Aidt, Toke & Dutta, Jayasri & Sena, Vania, 2008. "Governance regimes, corruption and growth: Theory and evidence," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-220, June.
  9. Oded_Galor, 2004. "From Stagnation to Growth:Unified Growth Theory," Working Papers 2004-15, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  10. Caselli, Francesco & Esquivel, Gerardo & Lefort, Fernando, 1996. " Reopening the Convergence Debate: A New Look at Cross-Country Growth Empirics," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 363-89, September.
  11. José Cheibub & Jennifer Gandhi & James Vreeland, 2010. "Democracy and dictatorship revisited," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 143(1), pages 67-101, April.
  12. Edward Glaeser & Giacomo Ponzetto & Andrei Shleifer, 2006. "Why Does Democracy Need Education?," NBER Working Papers 12128, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Jan- Sturm & Jakob de Haan, 2005. "Determinants of long-term growth: New results applying robust estimation and extreme bounds analysis," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 597-617, October.
  14. Edward L. Glaeser & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer, 2004. "Do Institutions Cause Growth?," NBER Working Papers 10568, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2006. "Democracy and Development: The Devil in the Details," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001139, UCLA Department of Economics.
  16. Francesco Giavazzi & Guido Tabellini, 2004. "Economic and Political Liberalizations," CESifo Working Paper Series 1249, CESifo Group Munich.
  17. Durlauf, S.N. & Johnson, P.A., 1994. "Multiple Regimes and Cross-Country Growth Behavior," Working papers 9419, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  18. Papageorgiou, Chris, 2002. "Trade as a threshold variable for multiple regimes," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 85-91, September.
  19. De Long, J Bradford & Shleifer, Andrei, 1993. "Princes and Merchants: European City Growth before the Industrial Revolution," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(2), pages 671-702, October.
  20. Angel de la Fuente & Rafael Domenech, 2001. "Schooling Data, Technological Diffusion, and the Neoclassical Model," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 323-327, May.
  21. Benjamin F. Jones & Benjamin A. Olken, 2005. "Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth Since World War II," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 120(3), pages 835-864, August.
  22. Andros Kourtellos & Thanasis Stengos & Chih ming Tan, 2010. "Do institutions rule? The role of heterogeneity in the institutions vs. geography debate," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(3), pages 1710-1719.
  23. Yuriy Gorodnichenko & Gerard Roland, 2011. "Which Dimensions of Culture Matter for Long-Run Growth?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(3), pages 492-98, May.
  24. Torsten Persson, 2004. "Presidential Address: Consequences of Constitutions," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(2-3), pages 139-161, 04/05.
  25. Bhattacharyya, Sambit, 2009. "Unbundled institutions, human capital and growth," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 106-120, March.
  26. Seim, Anna Larsson & Parente, Stephen L., 2013. "Democracy as a middle ground: A unified theory of development and political regimes," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 35-56.
  27. Jakob De Haan & Susanna Lundström & Jan-Egbert Sturm, 2006. "Market-oriented institutions and policies and economic growth: A critical survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(2), pages 157-191, 04.
  28. Robert J. Barro & Jong-Wha Lee, 2010. "A New Data Set of Educational Attainment in the World, 1950-2010," NBER Working Papers 15902, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  29. Davis, Lewis S., 2010. "Institutional flexibility and economic growth," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 306-320, September.
  30. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1369-1401, December.
  31. Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, 1999. "Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker Than Others?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(1), pages 83-116, February.
  32. Theo Eicher & Cecilia García-Peñalosa & Tanguy Ypersele, 2009. "Education, corruption, and the distribution of income," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 205-231, September.
  33. William Easterly & Ross Levine, 2002. "Tropics, Germs, and Crops: How Endowments Influence Economic Development," Working Papers 15, Center for Global Development.
  34. Durlauf,S.N. & Johnson,P.A. & Temple,J.R.W., 2004. "Growth econometrics," Working papers 18, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    • Durlauf, Steven N. & Johnson, Paul A. & Temple, Jonathan R.W., 2005. "Growth Econometrics," Handbook of Economic Growth, in: Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf (ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 8, pages 555-677 Elsevier.
  35. Daron Acemoglu, 2007. "Oligarchic Versus Democratic Societies," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 47, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
  36. Ahamada, Ibrahim & Flachaire, Emmanuel, 2010. "Non-Parametric Econometrics," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199578009.
  37. Desdoigts, Alain, 1999. " Patterns of Economic Development and the Formation of Clubs," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 305-30, September.
  38. Davis, Lewis & Owen, Ann L. & Videras, Julio, 2007. "Do all countries follow the same growth process?," MPRA Paper 11589, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Sep 2008.
  39. Dani Rodrik & Romain Wacziarg, 2005. "Do Democratic Transitions Produce Bad Economic Outcomes?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 50-55, May.
  40. Bos, J.W.B. & Economidou, C. & Koetter, M. & Kolari, J.W., 2010. "Do all countries grow alike?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(1), pages 113-127, January.
  41. Barro, Robert J, 1996. " Democracy and Growth," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 1-27, March.
  42. de Haan, Jakob, 2003. "Economic freedom: editor's introduction," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 395-403, September.
  43. Gwartney, James & Lawson, Robert, 2003. "The concept and measurement of economic freedom," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 405-430, September.
  44. Eicher, Theo & Leukert, Andreas, 2006. "Institutions and Economic Performance: Endogeneity and Parameter Heterogeneity," Discussion Papers in Economics 775, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  45. Huynh, Kim P. & Jacho-Chávez, David T., 2009. "Growth and governance: A nonparametric analysis," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 121-143, March.
  46. Dollar, David & Kraay, Aart, 2003. "Institutions, trade, and growth," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 133-162, January.
  47. Temple, Jonathan R. W., 2001. "Generalizations that aren't? Evidence on education and growth," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 905-918, May.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00586038. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.