Braving the waves: The economics of clandestine migration from Africa
Illegal immigration from the developing world to rich countries is one of the most controversial topics today. Using a unique data set on potential illegal migrants collected in Dakar, Senegal, we characterize the preferences and characteristics of illegal migrants, and the manner in which these factors interact so as to yield observed behavior. On the basis of our theoretical model, we evaluate a measure of the time and risk preferences through the individual discount rates and the individual coefficients of absolute risk aversion. Then, we test empirically our theoretical propositions and we show that these variables play a role, in the illegal migration decision, in the willingness to pay a smuggler and in the choice of the method of migration, at least as important as "classical" migration determinants such as the expected wage in the host country.
|Date of creation:||10 Mar 2011|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00575606|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
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