Hayek et Rawls sur la justice sociale : les différences sont-elles «plus verbales que substantielles» ?
In contemporary liberal thought, Hayek seems to be completely opposed to Rawls : the first one is an economist known as the theoretician of « the mirage of social justice », the second one is a philosopher, who is the author of « Theory of justice » ; but Hayek can have written that the differences between himself and Rawls are « more verbal than substantial ». In spite of strong opposition between them about paradigm (evolutionism versus contractualism), the paper tries to find elements which might support such an opinion : the steps are quite comparable in the setting of norms (anti-utilitarianism, impartiality, experimentation) and lead to two versions of the same conception of justice in society. These two versions converge in the content of norms as well as in their hierarchy (priority of liberty, fair increase of opportunity for everyone, better condition for the poorest people).
|Date of creation:||2006|
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- Gamel, C., 1999. ""Le mirage de la justice sociale": faut-il craindre qu'Hayek n'ait raison?," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 99c12, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
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