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Attacking the weak or the strong? An experiment on the targets of parochial altruism

Author

Listed:
  • Simon Varaine

    (PACTE - Pacte, Laboratoire de sciences sociales - IEPG - Sciences Po Grenoble - Institut d'études politiques de Grenoble - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UGA [2016-2019] - Université Grenoble Alpes [2016-2019])

  • Ismaël Benslimane

    (IPhiG - Institut de Philosophie de Grenoble - UGA [2016-2019] - Université Grenoble Alpes [2016-2019])

  • Raul Magni Berton

    (PACTE - Pacte, Laboratoire de sciences sociales - IEPG - Sciences Po Grenoble - Institut d'études politiques de Grenoble - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UGA [2016-2019] - Université Grenoble Alpes [2016-2019], IEPG - Sciences Po Grenoble - Institut d'études politiques de Grenoble)

  • Paolo Crosetto

    (GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée de Grenoble - Grenoble INP - Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UGA [2016-2019] - Université Grenoble Alpes [2016-2019])

Abstract

Studies on parochial altruism have insofar focused on the causes leading individuals to attack any out-group on the behalf of one's group. Yet, we have no clue to understand why parochial altruists target specific groups, such as big firms in some contexts and refugees in other contexts. The present paper introduces an experiment to analyse the conditions under which individuals costly attack strong versus weak out-groups. In our study, 300 participants played a repeated Inter-group Prisonner Dilemma (IPD) involving multiple groups and inter-group differences in resources. The results show that individuals have a basic preference for targeting strong out-groups, but that attacks decrease when the inequality in destructive capacity between groups is high. Besides, individuals target weak out-groups when they are threatening their in-group status. Decisions in the game correlate with participants' political ideology and social dominance orientation. Overall, the results give clues to understand historical variations in the targets of political violence.

Suggested Citation

  • Simon Varaine & Ismaël Benslimane & Raul Magni Berton & Paolo Crosetto, 2019. "Attacking the weak or the strong? An experiment on the targets of parochial altruism," Working Papers hal-02391578, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-02391578
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr/hal-02391578
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    File URL: https://hal.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr/hal-02391578/document
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    Cited by:

    1. Benslimane, Ismaël & Crosetto, Paolo & Magni-Berton, Raul & Varaine, Simon, 2023. "Intellectual property reform in the laboratory," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 206(C), pages 204-221.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Parochial altruism; Terrorism; Social comparison; Inequality; Ideology; Intergroup conflict; JEL codes : C92; D74; H41;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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