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Arbitrer entre souveraineté technologique et politique de concurrence : la FTC face à la concentration verticale IonQ-SkyWater

Author

Listed:
  • Thierry Kirat

    (TRIANGLE - Triangle : action, discours, pensée politique et économique - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - Université de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - IEP Lyon - Sciences Po Lyon - Institut d'études politiques de Lyon - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - UJM EPE - Université Jean Monnet (EPSCPE) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Frédéric Marty

    (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur, OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po, CIRANO - Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse des organisations [Montréal, Canada] = Center for Interuniversity Research and Analysis on Organizations [Montréal, Canada])

Abstract

La Président de la FTC a été mis en minorité en juillet 2026 dans le cadre d'une décision relative à une terminaison anticipée d'une procédure ouverte pour un projet de concentration verticale dans le domaine de l'informatique quantique. Les divergences d'appréciations portaient sur l'opportunité d'obtenir des mesures correctives comportementales permettant de contrecarrer d'éventuels effets restrictifs de concurrence à court terme. Au-delà de la question concurrentielle en elle-même, le cas présente un intérêt quant à l'analyse de la complémentarité des politiques de concurrence et des politiques industrielles. En effet dans le contexte de financements fédéraux pour la construction de nouvelles fonderies (dimension centrale des risques de forclusion liés à la concentration verticale), la politique industrielle apparaît comme un outil de levée des verrous concurrentiels et la politique de concurrence comme un outil de préservation de la concurrence dans la phase de transition. GREDEG WP 2026/22 : https://gredeg.univ-cotedazur.fr/publications/working-papers

Suggested Citation

  • Thierry Kirat & Frédéric Marty, 2026. "Arbitrer entre souveraineté technologique et politique de concurrence : la FTC face à la concentration verticale IonQ-SkyWater," Sciences Po Economics Publications (main) halshs-05754622, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:spmain:halshs-05754622
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    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
    • L63 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Microelectronics; Computers; Communications Equipment

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