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Arbitrer entre souveraineté technologique et politique de concurrence : la FTC face à la concentration verticale IonQ-SkyWater

Author

Listed:
  • Thierry Kirat

    (CNRS, UMR Triangle, Université de Saint-Etienne, France)

  • Frédéric Marty

    (Université Côte d'Azur, CNRS, GREDEG, France
    CIRANO, Montréal)

Abstract

The Chair of the FTC was outvoted in July 2026 in a decision concerning the early termination of a proceeding opened regarding a proposed vertical merger in the quantum computing sector. The disagreement centered on whether to pursue behavioral remedies to counter potential short-term anticompetitive effects. Beyond the competition issue itself, the case is of interest for what it reveals about the complementarity between competition policy and industrial policy. Indeed, in the context of federal support for the construction of new foundries (a central dimension of the foreclosure risks associated with the vertical merger), industrial policy appears as a tool for lifting competitive bottlenecks, while competition policy serves as a tool for preserving competition during the transition phase.

Suggested Citation

  • Thierry Kirat & Frédéric Marty, 2026. "Arbitrer entre souveraineté technologique et politique de concurrence : la FTC face à la concentration verticale IonQ-SkyWater," GREDEG Working Papers 2026-22, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
  • Handle: RePEc:gre:wpaper:2026-22
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    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
    • L63 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Microelectronics; Computers; Communications Equipment

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