Cartel and Monopoly Policy
Firm strategies are deeply affected by the legal framework which rules the relationships between the economic agents regarding monopoly and cartel policy. Undertakings have to manoeuvre through a complex universe. Not only must they master the rules of the economic game of competition but also the legal rules of competition law which are characteristic of competition and add up to the aforementioned. Monopoly and cartel policy presents itself as an important limitation to the freedom of action of firms and as a source of risks because some of their behaviours or choices are likely to be challenged, even punished by the competition authorities for the sake of the market preservation. Yet, firms can be strongly tempted to be harmful to competition insomuch as cartel and monopolies or taking advantage of a dominant position are means generally efficient for reaching the goals companies are aiming at in a capitalistic economy: the increase of profits thanks to the growth of margins and the "quiet life" thanks to a better control of their environment. First we will present the bases of monopoly and cartel policy (1) then the rules that result from it (2) before taking into account the competition authority decisional practices and their consequences on the firms' strategies (3).
|Date of creation:||01 Sep 2012|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published, Handbook on the economics and theory of the firm, Edward Elgar (Ed.), 2012, 485-497|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00727681|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ |
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