Quels remèdes pour les abus de position dominante ? Une analyse économique des décisions de la Commission européenne
Among other factors, one can assess the efficacy of a competition authority by its ability to choose and implement its remedies. Up until now, a dense economic literature has emerged on retrospective merger studies to measure the efficacy of merger control. Yet, little attention has been given to remedies in the other major pillar of competition policy, i.e. abuses of dominant position. In this paper, we try to fill the gap by first highlighting what is at stake and second analyse the most emblematic cases. We focus on the European Commission, while U.S. cases serve us as benchmark.
|Date of creation:||2012|
|Publication status:||Published in Concurrences, 2012, 3, pp.30-45|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00727517|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
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