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Quels remèdes pour les abus de position dominante ? Une analyse économique des décisions de la Commission européenne

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  • Patrice Bougette

    () (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis - UCA - Université Côte d'Azur - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Frédéric Marty

    () (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis - UCA - Université Côte d'Azur - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, OFCE - Observatoire Français des Conjonctures économiques - Institut d'Études Politiques [IEP] - Paris - Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques [FNSP])

Abstract

Among other factors, one can assess the efficacy of a competition authority by its ability to choose and implement its remedies. Up until now, a dense economic literature has emerged on retrospective merger studies to measure the efficacy of merger control. Yet, little attention has been given to remedies in the other major pillar of competition policy, i.e. abuses of dominant position. In this paper, we try to fill the gap by first highlighting what is at stake and second analyse the most emblematic cases. We focus on the European Commission, while U.S. cases serve us as benchmark.

Suggested Citation

  • Patrice Bougette & Frédéric Marty, 2012. "Quels remèdes pour les abus de position dominante ? Une analyse économique des décisions de la Commission européenne," Post-Print halshs-00727517, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00727517
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00727517
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    Cited by:

    1. Florent Venayre, 2015. "L'efficacité du pouvoir ultramarin d'injonction structurelle en question," GREDEG Working Papers 2015-50, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), University of Nice Sophia Antipolis.
    2. Frédéric Marty, 2014. "Towards an Economics of Convention-based Approach of the European Competition Policy," GREDEG Working Papers 2014-06, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), University of Nice Sophia Antipolis.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Commission européenne; Pratiques unilatérales; Remèdes; Abus de position dominante;

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