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Loi relative aux libertés et responsabilités des universités (loi LRU), élection du président et conseil d'administration: une analyse en termes de pouvoir

Author

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  • Fabrice Barthélémy

    (THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - Université de Cergy Pontoise - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Alain Béraud

    () (THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - Université de Cergy Pontoise - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Mathieu Martin

    (THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - Université de Cergy Pontoise - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

The aim of this article is to measure the power of the members of french universities boards of directors, power such as mentioned by the law relative to the liberties and the responsabilities of universities (in french, the “LRU” law).We use tools from the cooperative game theory, and particularly the power index of Banzhaf. We shruow that the number of the representatives of a given group, for instance the professors or the students, and the power, are concepts the relationships of which are sometimes surprising. We provide examples where the real power of decision does not necessarily belong to the groups we thought of intuitively.

Suggested Citation

  • Fabrice Barthélémy & Alain Béraud & Mathieu Martin, 2008. "Loi relative aux libertés et responsabilités des universités (loi LRU), élection du président et conseil d'administration: une analyse en termes de pouvoir," Post-Print halshs-00444541, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00444541 Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00444541
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Pezzoni, Michele & Sterzi, Valerio & Lissoni, Francesco, 2012. "Career progress in centralized academic systems: Social capital and institutions in France and Italy," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 41(4), pages 704-719.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    board of directors; Banzhaf power index; power; french universities; conseil d'administration; indice de Banzhaf; pouvoir; universités françaises;

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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