Loi relative aux libertés et responsabilités des universités (loi LRU), élection du président et conseil d'administration: une analyse en termes de pouvoir
The aim of this article is to measure the power of the members of french universities boards of directors, power such as mentioned by the law relative to the liberties and the responsabilities of universities (in french, the “LRU” law).We use tools from the cooperative game theory, and particularly the power index of Banzhaf. We shruow that the number of the representatives of a given group, for instance the professors or the students, and the power, are concepts the relationships of which are sometimes surprising. We provide examples where the real power of decision does not necessarily belong to the groups we thought of intuitively.
|Date of creation:||May 2008|
|Publication status:||Published in Revue d Economie Politique, Editions Dalloz, 2008, 118 (3), pp.299-315|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00444541|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
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