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Statut résidentiel et durée de chômage en France et au Royaume-Uni

Author

Listed:
  • Carole Brunet

    () (GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Andrew E. Clark

    (DELTA - Département et Laboratoire d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Jean-Yves Lesueur

    () (GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Des études sur données agrégées ont mis en évidence une corrélation positive entre le taux de propriétaires et le taux de chômage en Europe et aux Etats-Unis. Les nombreux travaux économétriques sur données individuelles américaines, danoises, hollandaises ou anglaises, plus rarement sur données françaises, qui ont été développé dans la littérature ont conduit à des résultats très contradictoires. L'étude économétrique proposée dans cet article s'inscrit dans cette réflexion en proposant une analyse comparée, sur données individuelles britanniques et françaises, des effets du statut résidentiel sur la durée des épisodes de chômage. L'influence des différents modes d'occupation du logement sur la durée de séjour dans l'état de chômage est estimée pour la France à partir du Panel Européen des Ménages et pour le Royaume Uni à partir du British Household Panel Survey. On contrôle lors des estimations les sources de biais relevant de la censure et de l'auto sélection. Les résultats économétriques font apparaître des effets très discriminants entre les deux pays. Si la propension à la propriété immobilière augmente la durée de chômage en France, elle n'induit en revanche aucun effet statistiquement significatif en Angleterre. Dans les deux pays les accédants à la propriété manifestent, toutes choses égales par ailleurs, les durées de chômage les plus basses, témoignage de salaires de réserves différenciés au sein des propriétaires. Au Royaume Uni, ce sont plutôt les locataires du secteur social qui enregistrent les durées de chômage les plus longues, résultat qui ne réfute pas l'observation faite dans d'autres études d'une plus faible mobilité des locataires du secteur social par rapport aux locataires du secteur privé.

Suggested Citation

  • Carole Brunet & Andrew E. Clark & Jean-Yves Lesueur, 2007. "Statut résidentiel et durée de chômage en France et au Royaume-Uni," Post-Print halshs-00257191, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00257191 Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00257191
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    Cited by:

    1. Andrea Morescalchi, 2016. "The Puzzle Of Job Search And Housing Tenure: A Reconciliation Of Theory And Empirical Evidence," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(2), pages 288-312, March.
    2. Nathalie Georges & Yannick L’Horty & Florent Sari, 2015. "Comment réduire la fracture spatiale ? Une application en Île-de-France," Economie & Prévision, La Documentation Française, vol. 0(1), pages 17-37.
    3. Nathalie Havet & Carole Brunet, 2009. "Propriété immobilière et déqualifications dans l'emploi," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 24(1), pages 121-155.

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