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On unilateral divorce and the “selection of marriages” hypothesis

Author

Listed:
  • Éric Langlais

    (EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Résumé Le divorce unilatéral est modélisé ici en combinant des droit exclusifs sur la dissolution du marriage et différentes règles de compensations en faveur du parent qui a la garde des enfants. On étudie leurs effets de court terme (fréquence et efficacité du divorce) comme de long terme (sélection des marriages). Une baisse des coûts liés à la procédure de divorce a des effets qui ne sont pas triviaux pour la formation des mariages ; en particulier, lorsque l'on prend en compte l'altruisme des parents et les dispositions financières en faveur des enfants de couples divorcés, il apparaît qu'un plus grand nombre de mariages peuvent être conclus alors que le coût du divorce diminue. Classification JEL : D1-K10-K12-K41-J12

Suggested Citation

  • Éric Langlais, 2010. "On unilateral divorce and the “selection of marriages” hypothesis," Post-Print hal-05510761, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05510761
    DOI: 10.3917/rel.763.0229
    as

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D1 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior
    • K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)
    • K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure

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