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Creditor rights and bank capital decisions : Conventional vs. Islamic banking

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Listed:
  • Amine Tarazi

    (LAPE - Laboratoire d'Analyse et de Prospective Economique - GIO - Gouvernance des Institutions et des Organisations - UNILIM - Université de Limoges)

  • Michel Bitard

Abstract

Using a sample of banks operating in 24 countries, we provide robust evidence that stronger creditor rights are associated with higher capital adequacy ratios for conventional banks but not for Islamic banks. Such results suggest that, under stronger creditor protection, only the managers of conventional banks increase equity, presumably as a means of signalling better monitoring efforts and of avoiding loss of control. A possible reason for the finding that Islamic banks do not generally increase equity is that, under the profit loss sharing (PLS) principle, depositors share profits and losses with the bank. The role of creditor protection is hence irrelevant in an Islamic banking context. However, we show that in predominantly non-Muslim countries with less competitive markets, Islamic banks show a similar association between creditor rights and capital ratios as conventional banks.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Amine Tarazi & Michel Bitard, 2019. "Creditor rights and bank capital decisions : Conventional vs. Islamic banking," Post-Print hal-03560106, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03560106
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    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law

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