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Political parties in Canada: What determines entry, exit and the duration of their lives?

Author

Listed:
  • J Stephen Ferris
  • Marcel-Cristian Voia

    (LEO - Laboratoire d'Économie d'Orleans [FRE2014] - UO - Université d'Orléans - UT - Université de Tours - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Two margins of political party life in Canada since Confederation (1867) are analyzed—the extensive margin involving entry and exit (together with party turnover or churning) and the intensive margin determining survival length. The results confirm many hypotheses advanced to explain entry and exit—the importance of social and religious cleavage, election institutions, and economic circumstance. More novel are the findings that public election funding and periods with larger immigration flows have reinforced established parties at the expense of entrants and smaller sized parties. The intensive margin uses a discrete hazard model with discrete finite mixtures to confirm the Duverger-type presence of two distinct long-lived political parties surrounded by a fringe of smaller parties. Both parametric and semi-parametric models concur in finding that public funding and higher immigration flows are as successful in extending the life of established parties as in discouraging entry and exit.

Suggested Citation

  • J Stephen Ferris & Marcel-Cristian Voia, 2020. "Political parties in Canada: What determines entry, exit and the duration of their lives?," Post-Print hal-03539222, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03539222
    DOI: 10.1177/1354068818793659
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    Cited by:

    1. Stephen FERRIS & Marcel-Cristian VOIA, 2022. "Do Rival Political Parties Enforce Government Efficiency? Evidence from Canada, 1867 - 2021," LEO Working Papers / DR LEO 2948, Orleans Economics Laboratory / Laboratoire d'Economie d'Orleans (LEO), University of Orleans.
    2. J. Stephen Ferris & Bharatee Bhusana Dash, 2023. "On the structure of the political party system in Indian states, 1957–2018," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 1-35, March.
    3. J. Stephen Ferris & Stanley L. Winer & Derek Olmstead, 2018. "A Dynamic Model of Political Party Equilibrium: The Evolution of ENP in Canada, 1870–2015," Carleton Economic Papers 18-04, Carleton University, Department of Economics, revised 31 Jul 2019.
    4. Zhihao Yu, 2022. "Why Are Tobacco and Alcohol Control Policies So Different?–A Political-Economy Explanation," Carleton Economic Papers 22-05, Carleton University, Department of Economics.

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