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A Reference Point Bias in Judging Cheaters

Author

Listed:
  • Sophie Clot

    (UOR - University of Reading)

  • Gilles Grolleau

    (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - UM - Université de Montpellier)

  • Lisette Ibanez

    (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - UM - Université de Montpellier)

Abstract

Do observers judge differently a wrongdoer when s/he does not exploit a situation to its maximum extent? Using a social intuitionist perspective and taking into account the reference point bias, we hypothesize that people will judge a wrongdoing less severely when the situation is not exploited to its fullest extent. We run two experimental surveys in France and examine whether various wrongdoings performed in the business realm (overcharging travel expenses, overstating work hours, pollution) are judged less severely when different reference points are suggested: (i) no explicit reference point is mentioned, (ii) a reference point is mentioned and the maximum extent is reached, (iii) a reference point is mentioned but the maximum extent is not reached and (iv) the participant is invited to elicit a reference point corresponding to what s/he considers as the maximum extent. Our findings support that participants judge a wrongdoer less severely, when a reference point mentioning that s/he has not exploited the situation to its fullest extent is indicated or elicited. Our findings suggest that partial cheaters could emphasize their self-restraint to mitigate judgment and punishment if they get caught. We draw some managerial and policy implications.

Suggested Citation

  • Sophie Clot & Gilles Grolleau & Lisette Ibanez, 2022. "A Reference Point Bias in Judging Cheaters," Post-Print hal-03528307, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03528307
    DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2022.102485
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-03528307v1
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    Cited by:

    1. Chui, Peter M.W. & Fong, Lawrence Hoc Nang & Ren, Jinjuan & Tam, Lewis H.K., 2022. "Anchoring effects in repeated auctions of homogeneous objects: Evidence from Macao," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    2. Alice Guerra & Antonello E. Scorcu, 2025. "Parents’ vs friends’ influence on teenagers’ deception about gambling," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 589-624, June.
    3. Steinel, Wolfgang & Valtcheva, Kalina & Gross, Jörg & Celse, Jérémy & Max, Sylvain & Shalvi, Shaul, 2022. "(Dis)honesty in the face of uncertain gains or losses," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    4. Wang, Wenhua & Chen, Peikun & Li, Jianbiao & Niu, Xiaofei, 2024. "Institutional quarantine and dishonest behavior," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 104(C).
    5. Klijn, Flip & Mdaghri Alaoui, Mehdi & Vorsatz, Marc, 2022. "Academic integrity in on-line exams: Evidence from a randomized field experiment," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).

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    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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