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Prêteur en dernier ressort et statut de ''too big to fail'' d'un emprunteur souverain: le ''jeu de faux semblants'' appliqué à la crise russe

Author

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  • Cécile Bastidon

    (LEAD - Laboratoire d'Économie Appliquée au Développement - UTLN - Université de Toulon, CAC-IXXI, Complex Systems Institute)

  • Philippe Gilles

    (UTLN UFR SEG - Université de Toulon - UFR Sciences économiques et de gestion - UTLN - Université de Toulon)

Abstract

L'objet de cet article est l'analyse de l'aléa moral caractéristique des relations entre la Russie et le FMI. On s'appuie sur un modèle original de "jeu de faux semblants" comportant un prêteur multilatéral dont la fonction d'utilité dépend de la stabilité du Système Financier International, et un emprunteur souverain dont la dette fait peser des menaces sur la stabilité du système dont est garant le prêteur, de telle manière qu'il peut être optimal de prêter tout en sachant que les sommes correspondantes ne seront pas remboursées.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Cécile Bastidon & Philippe Gilles, 2001. "Prêteur en dernier ressort et statut de ''too big to fail'' d'un emprunteur souverain: le ''jeu de faux semblants'' appliqué à la crise russe," Post-Print hal-03318519, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03318519
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    Cited by:

    1. Cécile Bastidon, 2002. "Financement extérieur des pays en développement: une revue de la littérature des modèles de dette et de crises financières," Post-Print hal-03318518, HAL.

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