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Financement extérieur des pays en développement: une revue de la littérature des modèles de dette et de crises financières

Author

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  • Cécile Bastidon

    (LEAD - Laboratoire d'Économie Appliquée au Développement - UTLN - Université de Toulon, CAC-IXXI, Complex Systems Institute)

Abstract

Notre objet est d'établir, concernant le financement extérieur d'emprunteurs souverains confrontés à un rationnement du crédit, les bases d'un cadre d'analyse moins restrictif que celui des modèles de dette souveraine. Dans ces modèles, le défaut ne dépend, en effet, que de la décision du seul emprunteur, en conséquence de la maximisation de son utilité intertemporelle. Il s'agit, ici, de dégager de la littérature récente sur les crises financières les déterminants d'un défaut ne résultant pas directement d'un tel choix. Les principaux éléments concernent les caractéristiques de l'emprunteur, c'est-à-dire les paramètres de solvabilité, et de structuration ainsi que de fonctionnement du système de financement domestique. Enfin, le défaut est envisagé comme une des conséquences du comportement d'aléa moral des prêteurs.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Cécile Bastidon, 2002. "Financement extérieur des pays en développement: une revue de la littérature des modèles de dette et de crises financières," Post-Print hal-03318518, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03318518
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